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Abstract 
Traditional economic studies of innovation, built on the contribution of Schumpeter, cannot explain 
why firms of the same size and market power can show largely different innovation performances. 
Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding 
corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic consequences 
of different modes of coordination between firm participants. The process through which individuals 
integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is indeed central to the dynamic of 
corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by 
discussing why a theory of the firm must be put at the base of an economic analysis of corporate 
innovation. We then describe three main channels – corporate ownership, corporate finance and 
labour – through which a system of corporate governance shapes firm innovation activity. Finally, we 
examine the recent literature on national structures of governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What makes a firm innovative? For a long time, the traditional economics of innovation, inspired by 
Schumpeter (1942), dominated the ways through which economists approached this question. The firm 
was treated as a production function and innovation was considered as a direct consequence of profit 
maximizing behavior. In particular, firm size and market power were assumed to be the only two relevant 
dimensions for corporate innovation. Nevertheless, both theoretical models and empirical analysis along 
these lines of research left unexplained a large part of the picture, while they were perhaps most 
accurately described as fragile.2 Persistently, traditional studies were unable to explain why firms with 
similar external conditions could show (as they often do) largely different innovation performances.  
A second and heterogeneous body of studies has suggested that what the traditional theories were 
lacking is the understanding of the “organizational foundations” of innovative enterprises. Indeed, the 
process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central 
to the dynamic of corporate innovation. This line of research builds on an idea that dates back at least as 
far as the Coase’s (1937) contribution: the firm is not a black box, rather it is an institution that organizes 
the relationships between those who contribute labour and capital inputs to the production, so providing a 
mode of coordination alternative to the market. Thus, from this point of view, to ask what makes a firm 
innovative means that we must ask what are conditions internal to the firm conducive to innovation and 
to ask how systems of corporate governance affect firms’ investment strategies. 
Surprisingly, unlike traditional studies on the economics of innovation, such a field of research has not 
benefited so far from a systematic discussion and review of its major contributions. This paper is aimed 
at filling this gap. 
Studies that link corporate governance to innovation form a corpus of research that is difficult to 
disentangle for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, as Lazonick (2003) noticed, a theory of the innovative 
enterprise is still missing, which implies the absence of a theoretical base of research on this issue. 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive survey of theoretical and empirical research on Schumpeter’s hypothesis see Kamien and 
Schwartz (1975), Cohen and Levin (1989), and Van Cayseele (1998). 
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Secondly, lacking such a theory, contributions to the organizational determinants of innovation relate, in 
a disorganized puzzle, to various and different aspects of corporate governance.  
However, in this stream of work, it is possible to identify three main dimensions of corporate 
governance that are deemed relevant for innovation. A first dimension concerns the distribution of 
control rights and residual profit rights within the corporation, essentially the corporate ownership 
structure. How these rights are allocated shape the control power of a firm’s decision-makers over 
resource allocation and these decision-makers’ incentives to invest in the innovation process. A second 
dimension relates to the ways through which corporations finance innovative production. How and to 
which extent corporations are able to commit financial resources to irreversible investment strategies is 
crucial in order for the innovation project to be completed. A third dimension is that of labour. This 
dimension has been somewhat neglected by the traditional corporate governance research, but it is 
instead central for corporate production. In knowledge intensive production human capital is as 
important as physical and financial assets in creating innovation. 
Although both theoretical and empirical research often focuses on individual links between corporate 
governance and innovation, these three dimensions must not be conceived as separated in their effect on 
technological development. For example, a financial structure characterized by the involvement of 
thousands of small equity investors may positively affect corporate innovation activity because it favors 
the commitment of capital to long-term investment projects (Bradley et al., 1984). At the same time, 
however, it also pushes managers towards short-run strategies because it increases the probability of an 
ownership change due to takeover (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Moreover, a dispersed ownership 
structure may reduce the ability of the employer to enter in long-term relationships with workers, 
because individual shareholders can easily use the “exit” option, therefore depressing the development of 
human capital (Mayer, 1997). The various dimensions of corporate governance are likely to be related 
also at the macro level. For instance, countries tend to show market forms of coordination in both the 
sphere of shareholder-manager relationships and in that of labour organization, or in neither of them, and 
this shapes, in turn, the patterns of corporate innovation observed at the national level (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). 
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In this paper, we try to provide an organic and systematic review of the contributions on these aspects 
of corporate government and innovation, motivated by the fact that how institutions of corporate 
governance affect technological development is increasingly recognized as a crucial question for both 
legal and economic policymakers (see, e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Having clarified what we do discuss in this paper, it is worth emphasizing what we do not do. Because 
many comprehensive surveys of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate performance have been written over the years,3 we do not review that literature here, while we 
focus on those studies that explicitly address the innovation process. We do, however, briefly review the 
most influential theories of the firm, inasmuch as they provide some useful insights for understanding the 
organizational characteristics relevant to corporate innovation. 
We also explicitly restrict our discussion to the literature referring to business corporations’ production 
of innovation, and exclude from the survey the literature focusing on innovation performance of other 
forms of economic organization (such as cooperatives or public institutions). 
Finally, the usual caveat for survey papers applies to this one as well. Although we try to cover a 
representative spectrum of the papers on corporate governance and innovation, it would be impossible to 
give due consideration to all the many works written on this theme.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss how technological innovation has been 
taken into consideration by the theories of the firm. We then review the main contributions on the 
organizational determinants of innovation, developing our discussion along the three dimensions of 
corporate governance mentioned above: corporate ownership (Section 3), corporate finance (Section 4), 
and labour (Section 5). Section 6 examines national structures of governance and provides some macro-
evidence. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the book of Gugler (2001). 
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2. Innovation in the theory of the firm 
 
Technological innovation is the development of an original (higher quality) product or process, through 
the utilization of productive resources and the embodiment, combination or synthesis of knowledge in a 
new object or method. It follows that innovation is generated through a collective and cumulative process 
of learning, which requires the commitment of resources for a prolonged period of time. By definition, 
technological innovation involves three elements: (i) specificity of the investments, (ii) uncertainty about 
the result, and (iii) impossibility of anticipating future returns.  
(i) Investment specificity relates to the cumulative and collective character of the innovation process. 
The development of a new technology needs the interaction of knowledge and experiences by those 
individuals that are collectively attempting to innovate, so as to generate specialized skills specific to a 
certain relation. The coordination and integration of these skills in response to technological problems 
then generates new knowledge and innovation.  
(ii) Innovation production is highly uncertain. Underlying the innovation production there is a process 
of discovery that may or may not succeed in generating new technology. As a consequence, individuals 
cannot describe ex-ante every possible situation they will face and their future actions, while they must 
adapt to new information as it becomes available. 
(iii) Even if the innovation process generates new knowledge, the new technology or product may not 
be an improvement of the existing knowledge sufficient at guaranteeing commercial success. Thus, final 
returns and their distribution among those who have taken part (and invested) in the innovation process 
cannot be anticipated when the process starts.  
These three elements imply the impossibility of writing complete contacts that specify each party’s 
obligations in every possible state of the world. Individuals that engage in collective innovation 
processes are simply not able to foresee all future contingencies and contracting for details of every 
conceivable eventuality may be too costly.  
In a context of incomplete contracting, the need of specific investments causes the so-called hold-up 
problem, which relates to the possibility of a given party to threaten opportunistically to withdraw some 
of the resources from the relationship (after the specific investments of the other project participants are 
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made) unless his share of the final returns is increased. The consequence of the hold-up problem is a 
distortion in the initial investment decision; in particular, parties that are required to undertake specific 
investments may anticipate this opportunistic behavior and may refrain from investing ex-ante. 
The firm, as an ex-post mechanism of governance, provides a partial solution to this problem. The 
theory of the firm conceived by Williamson (1985) and then further developed by the New Property 
Rights School (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) describes the firm as a structure of 
vertical integration in which the ownership of the assets involved in the production process is 
concentrated in the hands of a single party, so that the incentives for opportunism are removed. Since 
only one party has both the right to make residual management decisions (i.e. the right to control how the 
assets are used under contingencies that are not specified in the contract) and the right to claim the 
residual profits of the production, the remaining parties lose the capabilities to make opportunistic 
threats. 
Yet, the firm as a centralized structure of governance is only a second-best solution, to the extent that, 
under a one-party-owner regime, the non-owner firm participants lose the abilities to hold-up as well as 
the incentives to invest.4 Since innovation is a process of collective and specific investing (the firm itself 
may be defined as a “bundle of skills”, see Nelson and Winter, 1982), it follows that the underinvestment 
by some of those firm members that are crucial for the innovation process to succeed may endanger the 
entire undertaking. This is the reason why the crucial problem of firm innovation production is to devise 
institutional arrangements for governing the relationships among those who contribute firm-specific 
assets, in the presence of multiple investors, uncertainty, and self-interest, and why understanding firm 
innovation requires an analysis of how and under what organizational conditions corporations innovate. 
The “shareholder primacy” view of the firm builds on the principal-agent paradigm, according to 
which shareholders (the principals) engage managers (the agents) to run the firm on the shareholders’ 
behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).5 Advocates of this theory argue that what enhances corporate 
                                                 
4 Pagano and Rossi (2004), in a Grossman-Hart-Moore setting, argue that, in particular, the second-best allocation 
of intellectual assets entails an underinvestment of human capital when many agents should make investments 
specific to the same piece of intellectual property.  
5 See Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for a pioneer contribution on asymmetric information problems within firms, 
while Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) for an assessment of moral hazard in teams. See also 
Smith (1998) for a discussion of the shareholder primacy view in legal scholarship.   
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performance, broadly speaking, is the shareholder control power over management’s behavior and 
strategies. It is also assumed that shareholders are the only residual claimants because they are the only 
economic actors that invest in the corporation without a guaranteed return, while the other firm 
participants are hired by the shareholders through arm’s length market transactions. So, the relationship 
between the firm and the employee is given by a series of short-term complete contracts, long-term 
relationships remain an exception and specific investments by non-shareholder constituencies are absent. 
The main problem with this theory of the firm is that it precludes an analysis of how business 
corporations might transform knowledge and physical resources in innovation. Indeed, on the one hand, 
shareholders’ investments are advocated as the only fundamental source of productive activities, on the 
other hand, the absence of any possibility of sharing in the surplus of superior performance therefore 
expunges the incentives for employees to devote their skills and efforts to the innovation process 
(Lazonick, 2003). 
Contrastingly, the so-called “stakeholder approach” envisions the firm as a wide constituency of 
stakeholders. Blair (1995), in particular, defines stakeholders as those who contribute firm-specific 
assets. Proponents of this model argue that the physical assets in which shareholders invest are not the 
only assets necessary to innovation, while firm-specific human assets are as important as (and often more 
important than) physical capital in generating innovation. Therefore, any assessment of firm innovation 
must consider the incentives and disincentives faced by all stakeholders who potentially contribute to the 
innovation process. In this context, the problem of finding mechanisms that lead to higher levels of 
investment by all firm-specific investors becomes central to a theory of innovation.6 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show analytically that the optimal investment decisions cannot be achieved 
if only one party (among multiple specific investors) owns the assets necessary to the production. 
Optimal investment decisions can be achieved when the assets are owned by an otherwise passive third 
party that controls the use of the assets, so eliminating the risk of hold-up between the specific investors. 
Of course, the third-party owner must be a generic input in the team who does not contribute something 
critical to the production. In Rajan and Zingales’ (1998)  interpretation this is exactly the role of passive 
outside shareholders. However, that shareholders will not use control over the assets to extract an undue 
                                                 
6 See O’Sullivan (2000) for a critical discussion of the stakeholder approach to corporate innovation. 
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rent at the expense of the other investors has been argued to be an implausible interpretation (Blair, 
1999).7 
Two legal scholars (Blair and Stout, 1999, 2006) develop an alternative theory according to which  the 
corporation itself, as a legal entity under the law separated from the investors, acts as the repository of all 
the property rights over the assets used in production. In their view, the corporate production is a team 
production where financial investors put up money and workers human capital. Thus, in order for the 
production to be successful, all the resources must be locked in to the corporation and none of the team 
members should be able to withdraw his contribution from the firm. Consequently, managers and 
directors are not agents of the shareholders-owners but they are “mediating hierarchs” who protect firm-
specific investments and distribute the returns. Blair and Stout (2006) conclude that the lock-in function 
of corporation promotes value creating corporate productions. 
In accordance with this view, Lazonick (2007) states that the claim that only shareholders have a 
residual claimant status ignores the ways through which the other stakeholders make firm-specific 
investments in the corporation without a guaranteed financial return, and he argues further that 
incomplete contracts pervade the innovation process. The so-called Organizational Control Theory 
proposed by Lazonick and others (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996, Carpenter et al., 2003, Lazonick, 
2003, Lazonick and Prencipe, 2005, Lazonick, 2007) affirms that an enterprise must engage in three 
activities in order to innovate: first, strategizing, through which the firm gives decision-makers the power 
to allocate physical and human resources to specific investment strategies; second, organizing, through 
which the firm creates incentives for team members to apply their skills and efforts to collective learning 
processes; third, financing, through which the firm ensures the allocation of money to the innovation 
process until it generates financial returns. The achievement of these three activities results, then, in the 
three social conditions that can lead a cumulative learning process to innovation. They are strategic 
control, organizational integration and financial commitment. Lazonick (2003), in particular, compares 
his theory of the innovative enterprise to the traditional theory of the market economy and argues that 
only firm-level organizational control (rather than market control) over the resource allocation can put in 
                                                 
7 The problem of the allocation of property rights within the firm can be further extended considering that property 
rights can be assigned also ex-ante on the innovation output, in addition to those on the inputs. On this point, see 
Aghion and Tirole (1994). 
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place these three social conditions. Specifically, it is the firm rather than the market that creates 
incentives that affect how individuals allocate their labour, that controls the allocation of money to 
alternative uses, and that shapes the type of investments in productive capabilities.8 
 
3. Corporate ownership 
 
3.1. Ownership structure 
The corporate ownership structure is the mode through which ownership rights (i.e., control rights and 
residual profit rights) are distributed within the corporation. Traditionally, the degree of concentration of 
equity ownership is considered as the main factor shaping the ownership structure of a corporation. Two 
different approaches deal with the relationship between ownership structure and innovation. The first 
approach affirms that a concentrated ownership entails a more effective monitoring over management 
strategies and, in turn, reduces the high agency costs associated with innovation, according to a principal-
agent framework. A second approach emphasizes that various ownership structures relate to different 
methods of enforcement in incomplete contractual relations concerning specific investments by firm-
internal and firm-external investors. 
The agency costs approach predicts that diffuse equity ownership negatively affects corporate 
innovation activity, because it enables the managers to pursue their own objectives, such as increasing 
their personal wealth and prestige, to the detriment of profit-enhancing projects. Indeed, small dispersed 
shareholders do not have incentives to monitor management behavior, inasmuch as the costs of 
monitoring exceed the benefits.  
This view is corroborated by the Hill and Snell’s (1988) findings, concerning 94 Fortune 500  firms 
drawn from research-intensive industries, that show a positive relationship between the level of corporate 
R&D spending and stock concentration. Similarly, Baysinger et al. (1991) examine the R&D 
investments in 176 Fortune 500 companies and, moreover, distinguish between individual and 
institutional equity owners. They find a positive effect of concentration of equity ownership on corporate 
                                                 
8 See Lazonick and Prencipe (2005) for an analysis of the innovation process at Rolls-Royce using this approach. 
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R&D spending, and argue that such an effect can be attributed mainly to the role played by large 
institutional investors, given their ability to spread R&D risk more effectively than undiversified 
investors.  
Some authors have argued that in the presence of substantial separation between equity ownership and 
business control contractual solutions to the problem of agency costs and information asymmetry in 
innovative productions may be beneficial. For example, Markman et al. (2001) discuss the beneficial 
effect of long-term pay, such as equity-based compensation, in reducing the managers’ propensity to 
pursue non-innovative strategies. Nevertheless, others affirm that incentive contracts, aimed at aligning 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests, are unlikely to be successful. Francis and Smith (1995) sustain 
that innovative productions make the design of incentives contracts highly costly, since innovation 
production is risky and idiosyncratic. As a consequence, contracting solutions are unlikely to solve 
agency problems between dispersed shareholders and managers, and diffusely-held firms end up being 
less innovative than closely-held firms. Francis and Smith (1995) also examine empirically the 
relationship between ownership structure and innovation outcomes of approximately 900 US 
corporations. They find that relative to firms where an individual investor (or an investors group) owns a 
large block of equities diffusely-held firms have a lower patent activity and focus more on growth by 
acquisition versus internal development. Holmstrom (1989), finally, argues that the larger the firm’s size, 
the higher the incentive costs of a principal-agent relationship. In particular, larger firms conducting 
innovative research face more difficulties than small ones, because they have to manage heterogeneous 
sets of tasks.9 
The second approach suggests that corporate ownership structures differ in their organizational 
capacity and in their ability to enter in incomplete contractual relations with various stakeholders. 
Battaggion and Tajoli (2001) affirm that the ownership structure shapes the ex-post bargaining over 
(and so the final allocation of) the quasi-rent generated by the firm. Thus, the ownership structure can 
directly affect corporate innovation by influencing the incentives of firm-external investors to participate 
in innovative activities. From this point of view, the coincidence between equity ownership and business 
control (that the agency costs approach deems to be beneficial) implies an asymmetric bargaining power 
                                                 
9 See Bitar (2003) for an introductory discussion on agency theory and corporate innovation. 
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between block-holders and small outside investors, and, in turn, reduces the capabilities of block-holders 
to make credible commitments to small outside investors. This should cause difficulties for the firm in 
raising funds and a consequent decrease of innovative investment projects, which are, generally, highly 
costly. Battaggion and Tajoli (2001) then estimate a probit model using data from a sample of 1233 
Italian firms and find that more capitalized corporations are more innovative, in terms of patenting 
activity. 
Mayer (1997), taking a different view, suggests that concentrated shareholdings may encourage trust 
and commitments. Indeed, in a system of dispersed shareholdings, individual shareholders can use their 
“exit” option anonymously, while a concentrated shareholder cannot do so, because of the reputational 
consequences. Large shareholdings, thus, should favor long-term relationships between equity owners 
and other stakeholders (such as employees, suppliers and outside financiers), and support firm-specific 
investments. The reputation concern of large shareholders is highlighted also by Miozzo and Dewick 
(2002), which examine innovation activity in the construction sector of five European countries and 
observe that firm-specific investments are more readily financed in the presence of concentrated equity 
ownership and cross-holdings. 
The approach proposed by Lacetera (2001) tries to integrate the principal-agent and the incomplete 
contracts perspectives. He argues that the core of the relationship between corporate governance and 
innovation is neither the agency costs nor the hold-up problem, rather it is the definition of institutional 
devices promoting knowledge flows and the integration of different capabilities. Specifically, the 
corporate ownership structure influences innovation because it affects who makes investment decisions, 
what type of investment investors make and how returns are distributed within the firm. As a 
consequence, equity ownership concentration reduces agency conflicts, yet it implies the involvement of 
block-holders in long-term firm activities, thus improving the block-holders’ knowledge about such 
activities. Phrased differently, ownership concentration may be seen as a form of both financial 
commitment and organizational integration. Lacetera (2001) goes on to perform an empirical analysis 
using panel data from a sample of 27 pharmaceutical companies. He finds that equity ownership 
concentration positively affects R&D intensity (measured as R&D/sales ratio). 
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Finally, Cho (1998) cautions researchers that corporate ownership and innovation activity may be 
linked in a two-way relationship. Cho (1998) performs a simultaneous regression using data on 230 
Fortune 500 manufacturing firms and shows that, while ownership structure affects R&D spending, the 
R&D spending affects corporate value and, in turn, ownership structure. This may question the empirical 
results obtained assuming that the ownership structure is exogenously determined. 
 
3.2. Owners’ identity 
Based in agency theory, traditional corporate governance studies assume that various ownership 
constituencies have homogeneous preferences concerning business strategies and innovation. However, 
the empirical research casts doubt on this assumption. Corporate owners may be families, government, or 
institutional investors. While the relationship between families or government ownership and corporate 
innovation production has not benefited from substantive theoretical or empirical insights, the effect of 
institutional ownership on firms’ innovation has received much more attention. A large body of empirical 
works focuses on this issue in a principal-agent setting and provides mixed evidence. 
Hill et al. (1988) argue that institutional investors are risk adverse, so that when they are major 
stockholders they also wield pressure on management to obtain good short-term performance to the 
detriment of long-term projects and innovation. This conjecture is empirically tested by Graves (1988). 
He performs a panel analysis on 22 computer-manufacturing companies and finds that institutional 
ownership has a negative effect on R&D intensity. Graves (1988) explains this result arguing that 
institutional investors have short-term interests and, furthermore, a limited knowledge of the firms or 
industries in which they operate. In a subsequent paper, Graves examines 133 US companies and does 
not find empirical support for the hypothesis of a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and R&D investments (Graves, 1990). 
Sherman et al. (1998) categorize the firms’ institutional investors into four types (pension funds, 
mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies) and perform OLS regressions using data from a sample 
of 271 US Fortune 500 firms. Doing so, Sherman et al. (1998) find that, while insurance ownership and 
bank ownership do not influence corporate R&D expenditure, pension funds ownership has a positive 
effect on innovation and mutual funds ownership has a negative effect on innovation. 
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Differences among owners’ constituencies’ preferences for corporate innovation strategies are found 
also by Hoskisson et al. (2002). These authors distinguish public pension funds’ ownership from 
professional investment funds’ ownership. They perform a two-stage regression analysis on 234 US 
firms and unveil that pension funds show a preference for internal innovation (R&D intensity and new 
product intensity) and that investment funds are associate with higher external innovation (external 
acquisition of new products and acquisitions to develop new processes). Managers of the former, indeed, 
do not feel pressure for immediate returns, rather they have long-term horizons. Conversely, investment 
funds are likely to prefer immediate returns. 
Contrary to the view of myopic institutional investors, Hansen and Hill (1991) unveil that larger 
institutional ownership is associated with higher levels of R&D expenditure. The authors examine 129 
US firms over a 10-year period and find that institutional holdings have a positive effect on R&D 
intensity. They suggest two possible explanations for this finding: first, institutions are professional 
decision-makers that benefit from economies of scale in information gathering and analysis; second, 
institutions may be locked in to their stockholdings, so that they cannot exit from a firm’s stock without 
depressing the stock price and suffering a substantial capital loss. 
The locked-in position of institutional investors is corroborated by Kochhar and David (1996). They 
test three competing hypotheses: the myopic investor hypothesis (i.e. institutions have short-term 
horizons), the superior investor hypothesis (i.e. institutions possess better knowledge about the market 
than individual investors) and the active investor hypothesis (i.e. institutions cannot easily divest in the 
short-run and, consequently, they encourage investment strategies beneficial in the long-run). Kochhar 
and David perform an empirical analysis using information on ownership structure and R&D intensity 
from a sample of 135 US firms and propose findings that reject the first two hypotheses, while they 
suggest the validity of the third hypothesis. More recently, David et al. (2001) examining a panel of 73 
US firms, found a positive effect of institutional investors’ activism on corporate innovation.   
Aghion et al. (2009), finding similar results, argue that institutional owners have better incentives and 
abilities to monitor than other owners. This increased monitoring, in turn, should “insulate” managers 
against the reputational consequences of an innovation project’s failure due to purely stochastic reasons, 
and should therefore improve incentives to innovate. Aghion et al. also report empirical evidence 
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corroborating their career concerns model, using data on 803 US firms observed in the 1991-1999 period. 
Specifically, they show that there is a robust positive association between innovation and institutional 
ownership after controlling for the potential endogeneity of institutional ownership.10 
 
4. Corporate finance 
 
4.1. Stock market 
To ensure the allocation of financial resources to irreversible investments with uncertain returns is one 
of the essential conditions to innovate.  
The traditional corporate finance built on the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) 
maintains that, under certain conditions such as perfect and efficient capital markets, financing decisions 
(i.e. various debt-equity ratios) are irrelevant to the firm’s strategy. With respect to R&D investment, 
however, this proposition may not hold. As Williamson (1988) points out, debt and equity are not only 
alternative financial instruments, but rather they are alternative governance structures. On the one hand, 
issuing new equity causes a reduction of the individual shareholder’s incentives to monitor. On the other, 
issuing debt induces shareholders to take large ex-post risks, since equity holders participate in the 
returns from successful projects while creditors incur the costs in the event of failure, which implies a 
creditor’s preference for low-risk projects. Williamson (1988) argues that these are the reasons why debt 
should finance redeployable assets, while non-redeployable assets (i.e. specific investments) are better 
financed by equity. 
Adverse incentive effects of debt financing for innovation are described in detail by Gugler (2001), 
who finds five reasons why debt is poorly suited to technological investment. First, when R&D assets are 
financed by debt, their specificity and low resale price may cause insolvency if a project fails. Second, 
asymmetry of information about R&D projects may discourage creditors from financing innovation 
activities. Third, early liquidation is likely to occur if cash flows from innovation are set throughout 
many periods and are insufficient to cover interest payments. Fourth, a large fixed-cost component of 
                                                 
10 For further evidence on a positive relation between institutional ownership and innovation, see Baysinger et al. 
(1991), Szewczyk et al. (1996) and Eng and Shackell (2001). 
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R&D expenditure makes diversification difficult. Fifth, creditors may be unwilling to finance risky 
activities, if they do not participate in the high-return states of such activities, but are exposed to the costs 
of failure. 
These arguments are corroborated by Bradley et al. (1984), who show that the debt to asset ratio is 
negatively related to R&D expenses. Analogously, Long and Malitz (1985) find that the five industries 
with the lowest debt ratios, e.g. pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, grow fast and are R&D intensive. A 
negative correlation between a firm’s leverage and R&D intensity is found also by Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993). They examine a sample of 295 US firms across 30 industries over the period 1978-1987. 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002), more recently, study an unbalanced panel of about 2400 publicly traded 
US firms in the period 1981-1998 and show that equity financing has a positive effect on firm 
investments for high-tech companies. 
Large and liquid stock markets, by providing firms with ready equity finance, may therefore play an 
important role in supporting corporate innovation activity. Gugler (2001) performs an ordinary least-
square regression of the R&D/GDP ratio on the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, using data on 
14 OECD countries in 1994, and finds that the stock market capitalization has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the R&D/GDP ratio. 
Lazonick (2007) argues that the stock market can influence corporate innovation in a variety of ways. 
First, the stock market induces financial commitment to new firm formation by enabling private equity 
holders to monetize their stakes (creation). Second, the stock market influences who exercises strategic 
control by enabling the separation of share ownership from managerial control, so as to give decision-
makers the power to allocate resources to uncertain innovation processes (control). Third, the stock 
market provides funds for mergers and acquisitions (combination). Fourth, the stock market provides 
means through which managers and employees can be induced to apply their skills to innovative 
processes, thus facilitating their organizational integration (compensation). Fifth, in speculative periods, 
the stock market serves as a source of financial commitment, providing the corporation with funds 
without the guarantee of a return (cash). 
In two related papers, it has been argued also that the relationship between the stock market and 
innovation may be a two-way relationship (O’Sullivan, 2000, Carpenter et al., 2003). O’Sullivan (2000) 
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suggests that shareholders of successful enterprises may not wait that the innovation generates 
commercial revenues and may “go public” to take advantage of the stock market evaluation of the 
innovation. In doing so, they leave resource allocation under the control of the organization, given the 
separation of asset ownership and managerial control made possible by the stock market. Carpenter et al. 
(2003), in a study focused on the optical networking industry from 1996 to 2003, show that innovative 
corporations may  supply cash to the stock market along with the stock market supplying cash to 
corporations. Indeed, given the large use of stock-based compensation in the New Economy, the stock 
market increasingly functions as a source of cash for managers who exercise their stock options, even if 
not for the companies by which managers are employed.  
 
4.2. Takeovers 
In the presence of active stock markets, takeovers are an important influence on firms’ investment 
strategies. In a typical takeover, a bidder makes a tender offer to the dispersed shareholders of the target 
firm and, if they accept the offer, acquires the control of the firm, and can replace the management. Thus, 
managers will be more reluctant to take self-serving actions that lower firm value, which increases the 
probability of a takeover. Takeovers, consequently, are generally viewed as a means for correcting 
managerial failure and providing a disciplining device (see, for example, Scharfstein, 1988). 
Nevertheless, takeovers may negatively affect long-term strategies based on specific investments, such as 
innovation activities. This can happen through both ex-ante and ex-post dynamics.  
The takeover’s ex-ante effects on innovation are of two types, both of which are generally deemed to 
negatively affect innovation. First, as Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue, even if takeover is not a 
certainty but only a possibility, stakeholders may not agree to implicit contracts through which they 
invest in relation-specific capital because they fear a future breach. Phrased differently, stakeholders may 
anticipate that a takeover increases the probability of ex-post expropriation and in turn provide 
suboptimal levels of firm-specific investments ex-ante. Second, under a “myopia” hypothesis, managers 
concerned that low short-term profits will result in unwanted takeover attempts, will focus on projects 
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with short-term payoffs and on visible activities, even at the expense of long-term corporate performance 
(Stein, 1988, Maher and Andersson, 2002). 
In accordance with this view, Johnston and Rao (1997) study the effects of antitakeover amendments 
and argue that these measures enable a firm’s management to focus on long-term business strategies 
without the threats of losing control of the firm or of job displacement. In particular, Johnston and Rao 
(1997) examine 649 antitakeover amendments adopted in US firms between 1979 and 1985, and show 
that the R&D expenditures to sales ratio remains unchanged in each of the five years after adopting an 
antitakeover amendment compared to its value prior the adoption. 
Pugh et al. (1999) use a sample of 183 US firms that adopted an antitakeover amendment in 1990 and 
report, for these firms, a strong increase in R&D expenditures (relative to both assets and sales) in the 
following four years.  
The evidence on ex-post effects, instead, is mixed.  On the one hand, some studies raise concerns that 
takeovers are followed by a reduction in innovation production. Indeed, after a takeover, managerial 
energy may be absorbed by the restructuring process to the detriment of innovation projects; moreover, 
successful bidders often have little interest in long-term investment strategies of target companies, while 
they may exercise rent-seeking behavior. Smith (1990) investigate changes in firm performance after 58 
buyouts of US corporations during the period 1977-1986, and find a sharp decline of ex-post R&D 
expenditures. Similarly, Long and Ravenscraft (1993), using a sample of 72 US companies that 
experienced buyouts, show a drop of 40% in R&D intensity during the 3 years after the buyout. 
Analogous results are reported by Hoskisson et al. (1994). Hitt et al. (1991) find a negative effect of 
acquisitions on both R&D and patent intensity of the resulting company.  
On the other hand, a number of recent papers support the hypothesis that takeovers are not detrimental 
to long-term investments in R&D and innovation, because equity funds provide superior management 
and enable acquired firms to seize innovative opportunities. Zahra (1995) uses data from 47 US 
companies and finds that, after a buyout, companies enhance their R&D units’ size and capabilities. 
Wright et al. (2001) propose an efficiency approach and argue that buyouts can create entrepreneurial 
opportunities leading to an increased R&D activity and patenting. Bruining and Wright (2002) examine a 
sample of Dutch firms and show that buyouts are followed by an increase in new product development. 
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Lerner et al. (2008) study the changes in patenting behavior of 495 US firms and find that after buyouts, 
while the level of patenting seems not to change, firms pursue more influential innovations, as measured 
by patent citations. Finally, Ughetto (2010) considers 681 Western European manufacturing firms that 
underwent a buyout between 1998 and 2004, and tests whether the characteristics of the deal and of the 
successful bidder can affect acquired companies’ innovation, which is measured by patenting activity. He 
finds that the post-buyout innovation output of an acquired company is better if the bidder is not an 
independent investor, is specialized in the buyout stage, is a European investor, and devotes a large 
amount of capital to the deal.  
Finally, Sapra et al. (2009) predict a U-shaped relationship between the degree of innovation and 
takeover pressure. They argue that, when takeover pressure is very low, both the takeover premium and 
the loss of control benefits that managers expect are insignificant. Therefore, managers choose greater 
innovation, because it is associated with higher risks but also with a higher expected payoff. Conversely, 
when takeover pressure is very low, the expected takeover premium and the expected loss in control 
benefits are both high, but the former dominates the latter. Thus, managers choose greater innovation. 
When takeover pressure is moderate, instead, the expected loss in control benefits dominates the 
expected takeover premium, which encourages managers to choose lower innovation in order to reduce 
the likelihood of losing control benefits.  
 
5. Labour 
 
At present, firm-specific skills are acknowledged as the fundamental input to innovation production. 
Nevertheless, both theories of corporate governance and of corporate innovation have done little until 
recently to address the problems raised by investments in firm-specific human capital. 
Investments in specialized knowledge and skills introduce a complication into simple models of 
contracting, inasmuch as such investments are specific to the individual firm where they have been 
undertaken. Indeed, firm-specific training has no effect on the productivity of the worker, after he has 
moved to another firm, so that the wage that an employee could get elsewhere is not affected by the 
amount of specific training previously received (Becker, 1975). In an incomplete contracting setting, the 
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main consequence of this is that the employer may adjust the wage downwards ex-post, behaving 
opportunistically, given that the employee has already applied his effort to the learning process. If the 
employee anticipates this opportunistic behavior, he will refrain ex-ante from developing firm-specific 
human capital. In the innovation process, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the final returns of 
the innovation are unknown ex-ante; consequently, employees may be unwilling to apply their effort to 
the process if they do not have a guaranteed return from their investments but have to bear the 
opportunity costs associated with making those investments. It follows that only when employers commit 
themselves to not extracting rent from workers, do workers have incentives to apply their efforts to 
collective learning processes. 
In this context, the organizational problem relevant to innovation relates to the need for institutional 
devices that protect non-contractible worker investments in firm-specific skills. 
 
5.1. Trade unions 
Clearly, trade unions are the primary way through which employees can increase their bargaining 
power over distribution of the enterprise surplus obtained from successful innovation.  
On the one hand, some studies argue that the “voice function” of unions allows workers to benefit from 
human capital investments. Daniel (1987) finds that UK unionized firms are more likely to invest and to 
adopt new technologies. Consistent with this result, Machin and Wadhwani (1991) undertake a probit 
estimation on 630 UK establishments observed in the 1981-1984 period and show that unionized firms 
are not deterred from investing in new technology, while, in terms of raw correlations, unionism is 
positively associated with the level of corporate investments. Corroborating evidence is also provided by 
Michie and Sheehan (2003), who perform a probit estimation on UK firms data showing that unionized 
establishments are correlated with product innovation. Furthermore, using Australian data, Drago and 
Wooden (1994) unveil that active unions positively affect the probability of the introduction of a new 
technology at the firm-level. 
On the other hand, the idea of a negative relationship between unions and innovation finds some 
support in the empirical evidence. It may be argued that the development of firm-specific skills is costly 
for the employee (in terms of effort) as well as for the employer (in terms of resources allocated to the 
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training programs) and that where firms and unions are unable to stipulate incentive-compatible 
contracts, the employers decrease their investments in human capital and in new technologies in order to 
avoid union capture. As a result, unionism may have a negative effect on tangible and intangible capital 
investments. Hirsch and Link (1987) test this hypothesis on 315 US manufacturing corporations and find 
that firms reporting 50% or more unionization are less likely to show product innovation. Similarly, Acs 
and Audretsch (1988), analyzing patent activity in US, find that, to the extent to which unions are 
successful in rent-seeking activities, they discourage innovative investments and negatively affect the 
total number of firm’s innovations. More recently, the same negative correlation has been found in UK 
data by Menezes-Filho et al. (1998). 
So, whether unions can actually provide a way of solving ex-post distributional conflicts arising in the 
presence of firm-specific investments remains unclear, and the link between unionism and innovation 
still appears difficult to disentangle.  
 
5.2. Worker participation 
Another solution to organizational failures in the development of firm-specific human capital is an 
internal governance structure promoting employee participation in the firm’s decision-making even in 
the absence of unions. Worker participation (by which a direct voice in management is given to the 
employee along with some control over the allocation of final returns) is a device that may support 
internal commitments between employees and employer. For example, McCain (1980) develops a theory 
of board-level worker participation, arguing that it permits improved efficiency by creating a context of 
joint management and power-sharing, and prevents sub-optimal behavior resulting from incomplete 
labour contracts. Similarly, Smith (1991) argues that a worker participation mechanism corrects 
organizational failures, by providing employee “checks” on management actions, and encourages 
technical efficiency and the development of skills and new knowledge through the protection of 
investments in firm-specific human capital. 
As far as we know, empirical research directly examining the relationship between board-level 
employee participation and firm innovation activity is absent, while a few empirical papers focus on the 
worker participation in day-to-day decision making. 
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Michie and Sheehan (1999a) employ a qualitative response model on a sample of about 400 UK firms 
and find that employee participation correlates positively with the likelihood of firms innovating. In 
particular, the two authors unveil how regular meetings among work-groups or between union 
representatives and managers help cooperation and problem solving and in turn positively affect a firm’s 
innovation production, where innovation is measured by both the R&D expenditure and the introduction 
of new micro-electronics technology in production. In related work, Michie and Sheehan (1999b) explore 
data from the UK’s 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey and show that work organizational 
practices aimed at generating a high commitment organization are positively correlated with R&D 
investments. Similar results are obtained by Michie and Sheehan (2003), who perform a probit 
estimation using data on UK firms and find a negative effect of short-term contracts on process 
innovation, because they discourage commitments and trust between employer and employee. In this 
latter paper, firm innovation activity is showed, moreover, to be fostered by work practices based, among 
other things, on regular information sharing between employees and management, and on consultations 
involving negotiations. 
Laursen and Foss (2003) systematically test for the relationships between various types of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) practices and corporate innovation activity, analyzing the effect of such 
practices on tacit knowledge and specific human capital development. Thus, with respect to previous 
studies, the link between worker participation and innovation is thought to be the mode through which 
workers acquire skills rather than their incentives to do so. Laursen and Foss indicate two aspects of new 
HRM practices that positively affect innovation: first, an increased use of teams, which enhances the 
interaction between individual workers’ skills; second, job rotation, which promotes knowledge diffusion 
and information dissemination. The authors perform an empirical analysis using data on 1884 Danish 
business firms, and, consistent with their hypothesis, find that HRM systems governed by 
interdisciplinary workgroups, planned job rotation and delegation of responsibility are the most likely to 
drive a firm’s ability to innovate.11 
 
                                                 
11 For a survey on the relation between various types of HRM practices and corporate performance outcomes (but 
not innovation) see Michie and Oughton (2003). 
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5.3. Employee resistance to innovation 
A limited number of papers report some evidence of employee resistance to innovation. This 
phenomenon is generally explained by the fact that, given the sunk cost nature of human capital 
investment necessary for innovation, the lack of institutional devices protecting worker investments 
causes organizational failures. This is, for example, the case for firms in which unions are absent and 
employees do not share any decision-making power with employers. In particular, firm-internal 
resistance to innovation is likely to occur when it is uncertain whether the employees will be able to reap 
the benefits of their investment in human capital. 
Zwick (2002) provides an empirical investigation performed on data from the Mannheim Innovation 
Panel that collects information representative of the profit-oriented part of the German economy. He 
finds that employees do not oppose innovation per se, but they resist innovation when the employer is 
not convincingly committed to avoid job losses or when the innovation implies an increase in the labor 
burden. Contrastingly, employee resistance to innovation is showed to be lower when workforce-
management relations are better developed. Evidence on this issue is offered also by Hauschildt (1999), 
who uses data on 151 German firms. 
Bemmels and Reshef (1991) analyze managers’ perceptions of employee reactions to the introduction 
of new technologies, assessing 206 Canadian manufacturing enterprises. Their results suggest that 
worker resistance to innovation is lowered by an effective participation in the decision-making process, 
while the presence of unions (if it entails new ground for labor-management disputes) increases 
managers’ perceptions of employee resistance.12 
 
6. National structures of governance and macro-evidence 
 
6.1. Varieties of capitalism 
Organizational characteristics of corporations are likely to vary interdependently with the broader 
institutional context in which they operate. The modes of coordination of specific investors and the ways 
                                                 
12 For a bargaining model of the interaction between employers and organized workers on the timing of innovation 
see Ulph and Ulph (1998). 
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through which economic activities are integrated, then, generate dominant patterns in market economies 
and shape national trajectories of innovation. The last two decades have seen the fast development of a 
body of literature arguing that national settings largely differ with respect to this, so creating “varieties of 
capitalism” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996, Soskice, 1997, Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, Whitley, 1999, 
Hall and Soskice, 2001, Casper and Matraves, 2003). 
Whitley (1999) explains that different kinds of economic organization and control systems in market 
economies can be described as different types of business systems. Business systems are conceived as 
distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary across national economies in the mode of 
coordination of, and interconnection between, shareholders, managers and other employees. Whitley 
(1999) proposes three key dimensions for comparing business systems: ownership coordination, non-
ownership coordination, and employment relations.  
Ownership coordination concerns the relationships between shareholders and controllers of corporate 
resource allocation and activities. There are three relevant sub-dimensions: type of shareholder control of 
firms (that can be direct control, alliance or delegated control, and market or arm’s length portfolio 
control), the extent of ownership integration of production chains (i.e. degree of vertical integration), and 
the extent of ownership integration of activities across sectors (i.e. degree of horizontal integration). 
Non-ownership coordination refers to the integration of activities in inter-firm relationships. This can 
be described along three lines that are, respectively, the degree of alliance coordination of production 
chains, the degree of collaboration between competitors, and the degree of alliance coordination of 
sectors. 
Finally, employment relations can be described by the degree of employer-employee interdependence 
(the two extreme cases are the Japanese organization-based employment system and the Anglo-Saxon 
pattern of flexible external labour market). Different degrees of managerial delegation to, and trust of, 
employees are then associated to the different types of employment relations (the pure cases are scientific 
management, on one side, and responsible autonomy, on the other).13 
                                                 
13 For a detailed discussion on national institutional diversity and technological development see, among others, 
Chandler et al. (1997) and Berger and Dore (1996). 
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Soskice (1997) and Hall and Soskice (2001) directly link national structures of governance to national 
patterns of corporate innovation. They argue that national systems of institutional coordination devices 
provide different solutions to incomplete contracting problems across micro-level actors, so that different 
institutional models sustain different types of innovation. In particular, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
distinguish between market and non-market forms of business coordination. Market forms of 
coordination (such as those of the USA, United Kingdom, and other Anglo-Saxon economies) are 
characterized by liquid capital markets and flexible labour markets, which encourages the use of the 
“exit” option by the contract’s parties in economic relations. This inhibits alliances and, in general, 
commitments, because contractual parties can change quickly. At the opposite, non-market forms of 
coordination (typical of Germany, some continental European economies and, with several peculiarities, 
Japan) have institutional structures that facilitate the solution of incomplete contracting dilemmas. Here, 
strong trade unions, cross-shareholdings and reputational issues lead to long-term and credible 
relationships between most actors within the economy in the context of both intra-firm and inter-firm 
relationships. Therefore, on the one hand, market forms of coordination should be better at supporting 
radical innovation, which requires a low asset specificity (for example, this is the case of pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology); on the other hand, non-market forms of coordination facilitate the development of 
highly specific assets, which substantially characterize incremental innovation (typical of mechanical 
engineering). 
Using data from the European Patent Office, Hall and Soskice (2001) show that, according to their 
argument, in the 1984-1994 period German firms have increased their innovative specialization in 
mechanical engineering, product handling, transport, consumer durables and machine tools sectors, while 
US firms have innovated mainly in medical engineering, biotechnology, semiconductors and 
telecommunications sectors. 
Casper and Matraves (2003) provide corroborating evidence, reporting aggregate data on R&D 
expenditure for the pharmaceutical industry, showing that UK firms have outperformed German firms in 
the late 1990s. Similar conclusions are reached also by Tylecote and Conesa (1999), who show that in 
the period 1989-1992 innovation activity in Germany was higher in chemicals and motor vehicles, while 
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the US was more innovative in pharmaceuticals. Within this framework, a country analysis of the French 
case is provided by Goyer (2001). 
From a similar perspective, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1996) explain national patterns of corporate 
innovation analyzing the organizational problems relating to financial commitments. The two authors 
emphasize that the increased concentration of control over shares by fund managers and institutional 
investors in the USA and UK forces managers to focus on short-term performance, since managers can 
switch portfolios of assets between shot and long-term assets at quite short notice. Thus, although 
delegation of decision-making powers by equity owners to managers is high in the Anglo-Saxon system, 
the same system imposes strong short-term financial criteria on corporate strategies. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (1996) argue that this is shown by the fact that, in the USA, corporations seek to minimize 
the skill base on which the innovative process relies, by means of skill-displacing strategies. Conversely, 
Germany is characterized by strong financial commitments and organizational integration, which makes 
Germany more competitive in the chemical, electrical and mechanical sectors, where human capital and 
integrated skills are fundamental. 
 
6.7. Institutional complementarities 
Institutional complementarities between macro-spheres of the political economy are particularly 
relevant in shaping innovation patterns of corporations. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 
complementarities are present when doing more of one activity increases (or at least does not decrease) 
the marginal profitability of each other activity in the group. Such a definition can be applied to 
institutions as well (see, e.g., Aoki, 2001). 
Hall and Gingerich (2004) provide an empirical analysis of the economic effects of institutional 
complementarities in the macroeconomy. They consider, in particular, the relationship between the 
labour market (as described by the level of wage-claims coordination, the degree of wage coordination 
between unions and employers, and labour turnover) and some institutions of corporate governance (such 
as shareholder control power, dispersion of control, and size of the stock market). First, they find a strong 
and statistically significant relationship between coordination in labour relations and corporate 
governance. Countries show high levels of coordination in both their labour relations and corporate 
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governance spheres, or in neither of them. Second, the authors argue that, on the one hand, in highly 
coordinated economies firms easily enter into collaborative arrangements with other firms for the 
purpose of research and product development, thus substantial amounts of technology transfer take place 
through inter-firm collaboration; on the other hand, where fluid capital markets facilitate the movement 
of funds across endeavors, firms find it more efficient to access technology by licensing or by acquiring 
other firms, and they are more likely to invest in assets that can be switched to other uses as new 
opportunities emerge. Providing more complete evidence, Hall and Gingerich (2004) conclude that 
aggregate economic performance should be better in nations where institutional arrangements correspond 
more closely to pure types of liberal or coordinated economic organizations. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Although Coase opened the economics of firms in 1937, for many decades the economics of innovation 
has remained an economics with firms, according to the Schumpeterian tradition. Contrastingly, the 
organizational foundations of corporate innovation have received much more attention within the 
corporate governance research, to the extent that such literature examines the economic consequences of 
different modes of coordination between firm participants. 
In this paper, we have discussed the main contributions exploring the relationship between the various 
dimensions of corporate governance and firms’ innovation performance, providing, to the best our 
knowledge, the first literature review on this theme. 
As we explained at the beginning of the paper, to organize such a body of literature is rather difficult, 
since they form an heterogeneous and somewhat disorganized puzzle, that crosses interrelated (but 
apparently far from each other) aspects of corporate organization. In particular, we have started outlining 
why a theory of the firm must be put at the base of an economic analysis of corporate innovation. We 
then described the main channels through which a system of corporate governance shapes innovation 
activity, having classified them in the three dimensions of corporate ownership, corporate finance and 
labour. Finally, we considered a larger perspective and examined the recent literature on national 
structures of governance.  
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However, despite the relevance of the issue, a general theory of the innovative enterprise does not exist 
yet, as many have noted (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000, Carpenter et al., 2003, and Lazonick, 2003). Moreover, 
there is still much that remains unclear. For example, the growing “law and finance” literature maintains 
that shareholder empowerment and stronger institutions of minority shareholder protection should have a 
positive effect on long-run performance of corporations, by boosting the stock markets (see La Porta et 
al., 1998, and Pagano and Volpin, 2005). But the same literature does not address the risk of 
opportunistic actions played by small and diversified shareholders, which may pervasively depress 
corporate specific investing and innovation activities.14 Furthermore, research on the link between 
corporate governance, business strategies and innovation performance should take into account the effect 
of the recent strengthening of the international system of intellectual property rights (by the 1994 TRIPs 
agreements), that is likely to affect the specificity of corporate investment and organization and the 
effects of which are still far from being fully assessed. 
Therefore, we believe that much further research is needed to obtain a comprehensive picture of the 
organizational determinants of corporate innovation. With this paper, we have tried to take a step in this 
direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Some preliminary results on this issue are provided by Belloc (2010). 
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TABLE 1. Summary Table. 
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM  EFFECTS ON INNOVATION  MAIN RELATED WORKS 
Corporate ownership     
Ownership structure 
(concentrated versus dispersed 
ownership) 
 Concentrated ownership positively affects 
innovation because it reduces agency costs and 
disciplines managers’ behavior 
 Hill and Snell (1988), Holmstrom 
(1989), Baysinger et al. (1991), 
Francis and Smith (1995) 
  Concentrated ownership positively affects 
innovation because it favors financial 
commitments and organizational integration 
 Lacetera (2001) 
  Concentrated ownership positively affects 
innovation because it make reputation 
constraints stronger and favors long-term 
relations  
 Mayer (1997), Miozzo and Dewick 
(2002) 
  Concentrated ownership negatively affects 
innovation because it exacerbates asymmetric 
bargaining power problems 
 Battaggion and Tajoli (2001) 
Owners’ identity 
(institutional investors versus 
others) 
 Institutional investors positively affect 
innovation because they cannot exit from 
ownership in the short-run without depressing 
the price of their other stocks 
 Hansen and Hill (1991), Kochhar 
and David (1996) 
  Institutional investors positively affect 
innovation because they increase monitoring 
 Aghion et al. (2009) 
  Institutional investors negatively affects 
innovation because they have short-term 
interests  
 Hill et al. (1988), Graves (1988) 
  Pension funds positively affect innovation 
because they have long-term interests 
 Sherman et al. (1998), Hoskisson 
et al. (2002) 
  Mutual funds negatively affect innovation 
because they have short-term interests 
 Sherman et al. (1998) 
     
Corporate finance     
Financial structure 
(equity versus debt) 
 Equity finance positively affects innovation 
because it helps risk management and financial 
commitments, and reduces asymmetric 
information problems 
 Bradley et al. (1984), Long and 
Malitz (1985), Williamson (1988), 
Gugler (2001), Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002), Lazonick (2007) 
Takeovers 
(easy versus difficult replacement 
of management) 
 Takeovers negatively affect innovation ex-ante 
because they discourage specific and/or long-
term investments 
 Shleifer and Summers (1988), 
Stein (1988), Johnston and Rao 
(1997), Pugh et al. (1999) 
  Takeovers negatively affect innovation ex-post 
because the restructuring process absorbs 
managerial energy  
 Smith (1990), Hitt et al. (1991), 
Long and Ravenscraft (1993) 
  Takeovers positively affect innovation ex-post 
because they provide superior management 
 Zahra (1995), Wright et al. (2001), 
Lerner et al. (2008), Ughetto 
(2010) 
  Takeover pressure affects innovation non-
monotonically, depending on the relative effect 
of the expected takeover premium and the loss 
of control benefits 
 Sapra et al. (2009) 
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TABLE 1. (Continued) 
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM  EFFECTS ON INNOVATION  MAIN RELATED WORKS 
Labour      
Collective bargaining 
(strong versus weak workers’ 
bargaining power) 
 Strong workers’ bargaining power positively 
affects innovation because it allows workers to 
benefit from human capital investments 
 Daniel (1987), Machin and 
Wadhwani (1991), Drago and 
Wooden (1994), Michie and 
Sheehan (2003) 
  Strong workers’ bargaining power negatively 
affects innovation because workers rent-seek 
 Hirsch and Link (1987), Acs and 
Audretsch (1988), Menezes-Filho 
et al. (1998) 
Worker participation 
(large versus low worker 
participation) 
 Large worker participation positively affects 
innovation because it corrects organizational 
failures and encourages skills development 
 McCain (1980), Smith (1991), 
Michie and Sheehan (1999a, 
1999b, 2003), Laursen and Foss 
(2003) 
  Low worker participation may cause employee 
resistance to innovation because it causes 
employees to expect not to reap the benefits of 
their investment in human capital 
 Bemmels and Reshef (1991), 
Zwick (2002) 
     
National settings and business 
systems  
    
Modes of coordination  
(spot transactions versus long-term 
relationships) 
 Non-market forms of coordination positively 
affect incremental innovation because they 
sustain long-term commitments and specific 
skills development 
  Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(1996), Soskice (1997), 
Tylecote and Conesa (1999), 
Whitley (1999), Hall and 
Soskice (2001), Casper and 
Matraves (2003) 
  Market forms of coordination positively affect 
radical innovation because they encourage the 
use of the exit option and redeployable assets 
     
 
 
 
 
